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I.   Introduction 
Numerous empirical studies, including Moeller, Schlingemann and Stultz (2004), and Fuller, 
Netter and Stegemoller (2002) have found that acquiring companies tend to overpay for 
acquisitions. One possible explanation of the empirical results is that managers of bidding 
firms may suffer from hubris (see Roll (1986)). Another explanation is the free cash flow 
hypothesis. Jensen (1986) argues that empire-building managements would rather make an 
acquisition than increase payout to shareholders. Such managerial overconfidence during 
takeovers is confirmed in more recent papers by Heaton (2002) and Malmendier and Tate 
(2005). 
Other theories expect takeover attempts to be value destroying, such as Jensen’s (1986) 
agency cost theory and the theory of managerial entrenchment established by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1989). Jensen’s theory is related to excess free cash flows in a company, as for 
example in the oil business in the 1970s. Whenever there are less investment opportunities 
than available free cash, often this excess capital is used for takeovers, which leads to value-
reducing diversification decisions. Shleifer and Vishny’s theory implies empire building by 
managers. Here, takeover transactions are pursued to improve the management’s position by 
increasing the managers’ value to the shareholders, without actually enhancing the value to 
the shareholders themselves (Weston, Mitchell & Mulherin, 2004). 
There is a also an extensive literature on the management resistance to takeover, including 
Baron (1983), and Schwert (2000). The management of the target firm in an acquisition may 
turn down a tender offer for a number of reasons: It wants to retain control of the company; 3
the offer may not reflect the true value of the firm; or the offer may reflect the true value but 
management might be waiting for a better offer. The idea that management does not accept a 
tender offer and recommends shareholders to reject the offer, in anticipation of a better offer, 
is also reflected in the management being aware of the value that the option to delay accepting 
a tender offer has. Schwert (2000) highlights that if the goal of the target firm from taking a 
hostile stance to takeover is to bargain for a better offer, this can lead to a higher premium 
paid to target shareholders. Hard bargaining in pursuit of a higher premium potentially leads 
to a lower success rate. By understanding which factors, if any, have the highest explanatory 
power in determining the value premium for the option to delay accepting the offer, can have 
important implications for management’s strategy in deciding to prolong the takeover bid. 
Just how effective is this strategy to the target company, and what is the value of this strategy 
to the target company’s shareholders, are 2 of the important issues which the real option 
valuation model is able to answer. 
In this paper we answer these questions by bringing together these two strands of the literature 
on the tendency for managers of the acquiring firm to overpay for an acquisition and the 
target management’s resistance to takeover. There is a large literature in corporate finance 
that studies the information and value effects of mergers. There has also been extensive 
testing of option-pricing models for financial assets; however, virtually to our knowledge no 
research has been conducted on the empirical applications of option-based valuations models 
for tender offers. We value this amount by using a real option methodology to empirically 
value the option to delay accepting a tender offer. These results have important implications 
for the management of both target and bidder banks in their decisions for merger and 
acquisition behavior. 4
This research is the first to examine the empirical prediction of a real option pricing model 
using a large sample of data of 424 mergers and acquisitions between 1997 and 2005 in the 
U.S. banking industry. We argue that if firm managers suffer from empire building and 
hubris, they are likely to put in a higher second offer for the acquisition if the tender offer is 
rejected. This gives the target firm a valuable option to wait in accepting a tender offer. 
Our empirical results show that market prices reflect a premium for the option to wait to 
accept an offer that has a mean value of almost 12.5% for a sample of 424 mergers and 
acquisitions between 1997 and 2005 in the U.S. banking industry. The synergy value to the 
acquiring bank is therefore estimated at am eighth of the market capitalization of the target 
bank. Regression analysis reveals that the option price is related to the free cash flows of the 
targets among others. We conclude that it is certainly in the shareholders best interest if 
subsequent offers are awaited; hence patience on behalf of target banks pays.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section II we present the methodology 
and data. We define the option that will be valued by specifying the parameters needed for 
valuing a real option, outline the option valuation methodology adopted and present the 
sample selection. Section III discusses the empirical results. Conclusions are presented in 
Section IV. 5
II.   Methodology and Data
II.1  The Option to Delay Accepting a Tender Offer 
When a tender offer is presented at time t to the shareholders of a company, they receive an 
offer price Pt  to sell their shares currently worth S t  to the acquirer, resulting in a gain of Pt - 
St. The shareholders may accept this offer immediately or wait with their offer of acceptance 
until a date T. This final date is usually specified by the acquirer but may also be determined 
by the applicable legislation concerning mergers and acquisitions. The shareholders in the 
target company therefore have the option to sell their shares now for the gain specified above 
or wait until date T is reached and sell their shares later for ST. 
In general, shareholders would accept the offer straight away if Pt - St is higher than the 
present value of receiving Pt – ST  at time T, discounting at the risk-free rate. However, by 
receiving the offer Pt which elapses at time T, shareholders are presented with an American 
call option to wait for a higher, second, third or a final offer P2, P3, or PT , which is larger than 
Pt and therefore represents a gain of PT - ST > Pt – ST or an incremental gain of Pt – PT. By 
waiting for such an offer, the shareholders run the risk that the acquirer withdraws his bid and 
they receive nothing or receive a lower offer with  PT  < Pt. Accordingly, the option to wait 
that is valued here has the possible payoffs of  
max[ PV(PT – ST  ) ; Pt – ST )]. 6
II.2 Option  Value  Determinants 
Current Value of the Underlying Asset (V) 
The value of the underlying asset is the gain the shareholders make by accepting a tender 
offer and selling their shares at a premium over the market value of the shares before the 
announcement was made. It is therefore dependent on the difference between the final offer 
PT and the target companies share price St , before any bid was received. This implies that 
t T S P V − = . 
Stock price volatility (σ
2) 
The price volatility of the target companies share price is a crucial element in the real option 
model. In our framework the stock price variance can be estimated directly, t is therefore 
analogous to determining the variance when valuing a regular financial option on a stock
2. 
Exercise price (X) 
The exercise price in the real option model is the investment that must be made in order to 
acquire the underlying asset. In this case if the target shareholders accept the second offer 
they cannot receive the premium from the first offer so by tendering their shares for a gain of 
V they lose Pt – St. It is important to note that X is not equal to S, because if the bid is 
withdrawn (PT = 0) and in the case that PT < Pt , the shareholders would actually lose a part of 
the gain they would have made if they had accepted the offer of Pt – St. The price that has to 
be paid to exercise the option is therefore given as  t t S P X − = . 
                                               
2 Davis (1998), Luehrman (1998) and Damodaran (1999) point out that the variance is the most 
difficult part to determine in real option valuation when it cannot be observed directly, and estimation is 
possible but difficult and imprecise. Alternatively, Fabozzi (2005) uses a backward approach by 
comparing similar options with known option values to find the implied volatility. 7
Time to expiration (T) 
The time to maturity of an American call option is the date until which the option’s holder has 
the right to acquire the underlying asset. For valuing the option to wait, time T can be 
determined by a multiple of variables, such as the acquirer setting a deadline or legislation 
specifying a time until which the takeover process has to be completed. It is even possible that 
the option cannot expire in the case when a tender offered has been declared unconditional 
after a certain threshold and the acquisition of shares has been exceeded. For consistency we 
determine the time, T, by the date when the transaction is successfully completed; or in the 
case when the offer is withdrawn, at the time when the transaction is aborted. 
Discount rates (r) 
As is standard in the real option pricing literature risk neutral valuation is adopted, see 
Fernández (2002)
3. To be able to apply risk-neutral valuation, discount rates equal to the 
respective risk-free rates over the life of the option must be chosen. In general, the higher the 
interest rate, the larger the call option value, because higher interest rates reduce the present 
value of the strike price. The risk-free rate is chosen so that it corresponds to the length of the 
life of the option. 
Dividend payout (δ) 
                                               
3 Standard financial options are priced using the risk-free rate, resting on risk-neutral valuation made 
possible by a no-arbitrage argument since the underlying asset is traded and so the payoff of the 
option can be replicated. In many cases it is possible to use risk-neutral valuation even though the 
underlying asset is not traded, Constantinides (1978) and Harrison and Kreps, (1979); otherwise 
determining an appropriate discount rate is difficult, imprecise and very time-consuming. 8
The presence of discrete dividends or a continuous dividend yield on the underlying stock 
price decreases the value of the option and in some cases makes it optimal to exercise the 
option early (Hull, 2002). Dividends represent a cash-outflow of the underlying asset that 
cannot be captured anymore by the holder of the option and the value of the option decreases. 
In real option analysis the dividend yield is usually labeled the cost of delay but the effect 
remains the same. 
II.2 Option  Valuation  Methodology 
II.2.1  Simulating vs. Approximating Stochastic Processes 
When there is no analytical solution for valuing an option, or if an analytic solution can not be 
applied, there are two other main approaches for valuation. Either direct simulation of the 
stochastic processes determining the evolution of the price of the underlying asset, or, by 
approximating the stochastic processes by partial differential equations. Monte Carlo 
simulation and lattice methods belong to the first category whereas methods of numerical 
integration and explicit or implicit finite difference schemes belong to the second category. 
Since the option to be analyzed here is American, Monte Carlo simulation should not be used 
(Trigeorgis, 1996). In our framework it is more appropriate to employ a finite-difference 
method or a lattice approach. Geske and Shastri (1985) provide a detailed comparison of the 
approaches. They compare explicit and implicit finite difference methods, three types of 
binomial methods and the analytic Black-Scholes method for computing the values of 
American call and put options with and without dividends. They compare the methods along 
two dimensions. The method’s precision is measured by looking at the convergence of the 9
approximation errors and stability. Efficiency of the method is measured by computing the 
costs associated with employing the methods. The results by Geske and Shastri (1985) 
indicate that the binomial approach, the implicit finite difference and the log transformed 
explicit finite difference method give the best results. 
However, each method is especially suitable for valuing a particular type of option. Geske and 
Shastri (1985) recommend the binomial method for options where no (discrete) cash-outflow 
in the underlying asset is present and argue that it is still reasonably accurate when assuming a 
continuous cash-outflow (dividend yield or “cost of delay”). The explicit finite difference 
method has some stability problems but when transformed logarithmically is more efficient 
than the implicit finite difference method
4. Their results furthermore imply that finite-
difference schemes can be equivalent to a dynamic-programming-type process such as used in 
a lattice approach.  
Following their approach, we value the option to wait using the lattice approach. A lattice 
approach is as precise as using a finite-difference technique but is more pragmatic since it 
does not involve specifying the partial differential equations to describe the stochastic process 
of the underlying asset. 
II.2.2  Lattice Approaches 
The binomial lattice approach for option valuation was first presented by Cox, Ross and 
Rubinstein (1979). Risk-neutral valuation is used in all lattice approaches, whether binomial 
                                               
4 See Geske and Shastri (1985). Researchers computing a smaller number of option values may prefer the 
binomial approximation, while practitioners in the business of computing a larger number of option 
values will generally find that the finite difference approximations are more efficient. 10
or trinomial, with the option value being determined as the discounted value of the expected 
option payoff. Lattice approaches determine the value of the option by constructing a 
multinomial tree showing all possible states of the price of the underlying asset over time. 
These values are obtained by using transition probabilities that determine the magnitude of the 
state variable at each point in time. Those time points have to be selected so that the tree 
converges in a manner that is accurate, stable and efficient (Trigeorgis, 1996).  
In principle, accuracy and stability can be obtained by increasing the time points until 
maturity while efficiency can be obtained by reducing the steps. Therefore, a balance has to 
be chosen between obtaining accurate results and saving computing time. Convergence is 
necessary since each step in the tree actually can be seen as a model of its own. Hence, the 
sequence of probabilities must converge to a limiting probability measure (Bingham and 
Kiesel, 2004).  
Starting at the end of the multinomial tree, corresponding to the expiration of the option, the 
value of the option is calculated according to whether its expected payoff is positive or 0. 
Using the possible option values, the values one period before expiration can be calculated. 
Successively all possible option values over time are calculated in a backward manner until 
the starting point of the binomial tree is reached and the current option value is calculated. 
All lattice approaches work according to this basic structure but many changes have been 
proposed to incorporate multiple options, discrete cash-outflows, improve computational 
accuracy or incorporate more than one state variable. For instance, Hull and White (1988) 
propose a control variate approach to be used with lattice approaches in order to improve 
computational efficiency. The control variate approach reduces variance by reducing the 11
dimensions needed in the calculation and therefore reduces estimation errors by about 50%. It 
requires the existence of a similar option whose value is already known, such as, for example, 
a European option with exactly the same parameters. Although it provides a significant 
improvement over standard binomial models the control variate technique cannot be used in 
our framework since no similar option exists. 
  
Another extension of the lattice approach by Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) is presented by 
Boyle (1988) who develops a method for valuing American options where two state variables 
need to be considered. This method also cannot be applied here as there is only one 
underlying asset and hence only one state variable. As mentioned by Geske and Shastri (1985) 
methods for incorporating discrete cash-outflows can be disregarded as they make the 
calculation far less efficient but only improve the results marginally. Therefore a continuous 
dividend yield will be used for valuing the option to wait. The lattice approach that seems 
most suitable for valuing the option to wait with the parameters specified above is the one 
developed by Trigeorgis (1996), which will be outlined in the next section. 
II.2.3  Calculation
The algorithm used to value the option to wait is based on the log-transformed binomial 
model presented by Trigeorgis (1996). The value of V is assumed to follow the diffusion 
Wiener process given by 
      dz dt
V
dV
σ α + = .      (1) 12
In this equation, α is the instantaneous expected return on V, σ is the instantaneous standard 
deviation and z  is a standard Wiener process. For a small time interval this implies that the 
natural logarithm of V follows an arithmetic Brownian motion in continuous time or a Markov 
random walk in discrete time.
5 Assuming risk-neutrality and thereby implying that α = r
means increments in lnV are independently, identically and normally distributed. 
By expressing time in units of variance (in the form of σ
2T/N) increments in lnV become 
normally distributed, having a mean of μ(σ
2T/N) and a variance of σ
2T/N, where the drift 
parameter μ is defined as r/σ
2-0.5. We also include the dividend yield which reduced the drift 
parameter by dividend rate d. To be used in a multinomial valuation model, this continuous 
diffusion process must be approximated by a discrete process. This is done by dividing the 
time to maturity into N subintervals of equal length.  
Calculations are made for the subintervals, N, equal to 50, 100, 250, 500 and 1,000 
subintervals. Within these discrete subintervals the value of the underlying asset follows a 
Markov random walk, increasing by an amount ΔlnV = H with probability P and decreasing 
by an amount ΔlnV =  H with probability 1-P. This implies that the discrete process measures 
the value of the underlying asset V as lnV expressed in units of length H, and measures time in 




                                               
5 A Markov random walk is a special type of a discrete-time Markov chain and describes a process which changes states at 
discrete time steps and where the probability of the next stage only depends on the current state, disregarding the past states 
(see Bingham and Kiesel, 2004). 13
For reasons of consistency, mean and variance of the continuous and the discrete diffusion 
Wiener process must be equal. Therefore, the probability of an increase H in V for one k, P
must equal 0.5(1+ μk/H) and H must equal [k+(μk)
2]
-0.5 conditional on H being larger than μk, 
where k is defined as σ
2T/N. 
To be applicable in our framework, the option parameters specified in Section III must be 
transformed to achieve consistency between the continuous diffusion and the discrete time 
processes outlined above. As the previous paragraph described, these intermediate variables 
are defined as k (time step), μ (drift), H (state step), and P (probability).  
The next step consists of calculating the terminal boundary values at the last day of the 
option’s life. Hence, for each state i at j = T the following formula is used to calculate V(i): 





) 0 , 0 ( + =   .   (2) 
The option payoff at node (i ; T) is equal to the difference between V(i,T) and the 
corresponding strike price X(i,T), which is defined as: 
      ( ) [ ]
2
) 0 , 0 ( / * 1 σ k tr X +   .     (3) 
The final step consists of a backward iterative process which is used to calculate the option’s 
value at the announcement day of the bid. Starting at the terminal values at j = T the values of 
the option for the preceding node j = T-1 are calculated using the information for two states i 
present at j = T. This implies that according to P, the value of the option at nodes with j = N is 14
equal to the higher of the two values at the two possible states, at j = N discounted for one 
period at the risk-free rate, equal to equation (4) or the payoff from early exercise: 
     [] ) , 1 ( ) , 1 (
/
) 1 , ( ) 1 (
2
j i j i
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σ
 .  (4) 
II.3   Data 
II.3.1   Sample  Selection 
Our primary data set consists of a large number of transactions for mergers and acquisitions in 
the U.S. banking industry over the period 1997 to 2005 retrieved from Thompson Financial’s 
SDC Platinum. A merger occurs when an acquiring bank and a target bank agree to combine 
under legal procedures in the countries in which the merger participants are incorporated. 
Generally, mergers are friendly and require the approval of both management teams and 
management boards before stockholders vote. In contrast, inter-firm tender offers are 
generally of unfriendly nature, as the target management is by-passed by asking the 
stockholders to sell their stock or voting rights. Both kinds of transactions can be referred to 
as takeovers or acquisitions, which will be the terms that are used in the following. 
In order to obtain any evidence on the value of an option to delay a tender offer it is necessary 
that we are meticulous in constructing the sample so that other influences can be controlled. 
The original data of mergers and acquisitions was reduced to a sample of 424 deals in the U.S. 
banking sector, which fulfilled the following 8 necessary conditions: 15
1. The deal type was a merger or acquisition. 
2. Target and acquiring were both US based. 
3. Target and acquirer belong to the banking sector with respective SIC codes: 6000, 
6081, 6029, 6082, 6021, 6712 and 6022. 
4. Target and acquirer were both publicly listed companies. 
5. The sub-deal type must have been one or more of the following: contested bid, hostile 
bid, initially hostile bid became recommended bid, public takeover, recommended bid, 
initially recommended bid became hostile and/or unsolicited bid. 
6. The deal status must have either been completed or withdrawn. 
7. To avoid the issue of using equity as a signaling effect, we focus on cash transactions 
only 
6.  
8. The final stake the acquirer has in the target after completion of the transaction must 
be more than 50.1% to include only transactions where a change in control takes 
place. 
II.3.2  Variables 
Besides a synopsis and the general information gathered on the targets and acquiring banks, 
the announcement and closing dates of the deals were obtained in order to calculate the time 
to maturity. Furthermore, the initial offer and the final offer were compared to the target stock 
price one day prior to the announcement date. Also, the dividend yield one day prior to the 
announcement date was applied to avoid any announcement effects on the dividend yield. 
                                               
6 Travlos (1987) points out that those firms with poor returns generally pay for acquisitions with equity. 16
Additional data, necessary to determine the option value, e.g. dividend yield and risk free 
rates, was extracted from Thompson Financial’s Datastream. We employ the one month US 
interbank rate. For all rates, averages over the respective period from the announcement until 
the conclusion of the deal were calculated. For the regression analyses that were conducted in 
order to test factors that could potentially influence the option premium, all variables used 
were key item variables extracted from Thompson Financial’s Datastream. These were Cash 
Flow per Share, Market Capitalisation, Common Equity and Debt to Equity, Book Value per 
Share and Price to Book Value Ratios respectively. 
II.3.3  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for all parameters that are needed to determine the 
option values for the full dataset of 424 observations. The necessary stock prices are given in 
absolute and in standardised form. For simplicity, all absolute numbers are given in US 
dollars. N is the randomly chosen amount of subintervals into which the time to maturity is 
subdivided for the calculation model.  
Insert Table 1 
III   Empirical Results 
By applying the model to the described data set, we obtain option premiums that are realised 
by delaying the decision to accept a tender offer. Table 2 presents the summary statistics for 
the option premium of the data set, which relies on 250 nodes. Based on a total sample of 424 
bank acquisitions between 1997 and 2005, we obtain an average option premium of 12.45%. 
Insert Table 2 17
We find that this average option premium of 12.45% is stable from year to year. Although  the 
Group of Ten (2001) finds that the amount of takeovers and the takeover values constantly 
increased between 1997 and 2001, this research based on various sub samples finds that the 
average annual option premium does not vary significantly during the period of observation. 
Interesting is also the comparison between mean and median values. The median is 
significantly lower than the mean, which suggests that outliers exist that pushes the average 
premium upwards. 
Moreover, in 60 observations information about competing bidders was revealed. Without 
competition of other potential acquirers, the option premium was at 8% significantly lower 
than the average. Table 2 indicates that in the case that competitors entered the bidding 
process, the findings suggest an option premium of 18.43%, which is clearly much greater 
than the average premium paid. This is in line with previous studies and the winner’s curse 
theory first established by Rock (1986). As more bidders enter the process, the higher the bids 
with the winner probably paying too high a price for the takeover. 
The exercise price is already corrected for the time value of money due to the risk-free 
discount rate. Thus, a potential premium as it is determined by this research is instantly 
incurred when accepting the tender offer. As the option premium is of significant size, target 
shareholders are always better off if the decision to accept a tender offer is delayed. Even if 
the offer is withdrawn and the transaction is cancelled, the chance of a future takeover is very 
high. Our finding of an increased premium with competition in the bidding process also 
suggests it is highly valuable to delay the decision to accept an initial tender offer for as long 18
as possible. The higher the probability of other bidders in the bidding process, the greater this 
value.  
In contrast to the positive implications for target banks shareholders, acquirers must be aware 
of the negative impacts, in case the option to delay accepting the tender offer is exploited. 
Previous research implies that majority of the return to the target company’s shareholders is 
born by the bidder. Hence for the acquirer it is of importance to finish the transaction before 
any competitors enter the bidding process. 
III.1  Sensitivity of the Option Parameters 
It is highly interesting to gauge the sensitivity of the parameters in the option model to the 
option premium. The option premium is a positive function of the premium offered over the 
stock price at time t(X). The higher the initial tender offer over the stock price at time t, the 
higher the option premium to wait in accepting the offer. There is also a similar positive 
relation between the option premium and the final offer premium V. The variance of the 
underlying stock price has a greater positive influence on the option premium, as can be seen 
in Figure 1: the more volatile the stock price during the run-up to the tender offer, the higher 
the premium. Figure 1 also indicates that the longer the period until the target firm has until 
the tender offer lapses results in a significant increase in the value of the option. 
Insert Figure 1 
There is a positive and highly significant relationship between the premium on the tender 
offer, over the stock price at the time of the offer X, and the value of the real option. This 19
provides us with some empirical support for a model that incorporates the option to wait in 
accepting a tender offer. 
At time t the option value can be derived for the target firm in waiting to accept the tender 
offer. The sensitivity of the value of the option to the final offer can be calculated, so that the 
target firm can evaluate the additional value of waiting to accept the tender offer. To analyze 
in more detail which factors are more influential in determining the value of the option to 
wait, it is necessary to run some preliminary regressions. The results of these regressions are 
presented in Figure 1. It becomes apparent that the variance (Figure 3) is the largest driver in 
valuing the additional value of waiting to accept a tender offer from an acquiring firm. 
Insert Figure 2 & 3 
The second strongest driver is the value of the underlying asset. Moreover, we see that there 
are highly significant positive relationships between the value of the underlying asset, the 
variance of the stock price in the underlying period and the size of the option premium. 
III.2 Endogenous  Variables 
To try and determine which firm specific characteristics can best explain the size of the option 
premium, we analysed a variety of firm factors. Both for the acquiring firm and the target 
firm. The additional factors which we analyse for the target banks were, size, debt/equity 
ratio, earnings and price to book value. We also look at the size of acquiring firm, debt to 
equity ratio, FCF and price to book value of the acquiring firm. Dunis and Klein (2005) also 
do this for financial firms; however, use a different methodology.  20
Several regression analyses were conducted with the option premium as the dependent 
variable and several endogenous variables as independent variables. For the acquirer side, 
these were respectively Market Capitalisation, Debt to Equity, Cash Flow per Share, and Price 
to Book Value. For the target side, these were respectively Market Capitalisation, Debt to 
Equity, Free Cash Flow per share and Price to Book Value. Summary statistics of the 
regressions are provided in Table 3. 
Insert Table 3 
Price to book value can be seen as a proxy for company size. Hence, the size of the target 
company significantly influences the option premium. Furthermore, a low price to book value 
and the contribution to a higher option premium can be seen from the acquirer perspective. If 
the target firm has a very low price to book value, the acquirer is more likely to want to pay a 
premium for acquiring a valuable asset at a low price.  
It can be deemed very likely that target size influence the option’s value in some way or the 
other. In particular the notion that larger firms have a greater base of knowledge capital, 
greater efficiency gains from a reduction in overhead costs and hence greater overall benefits 
from synergy. Related to this, another interesting question would be to find out how previous 
takeover attempts and the percentage premium offered by the acquirer influence the value of 
the option. 
Schwert (2000) finds that target firms with higher market-to-book ratios are more likely to be 
successfully taken over. This may provide evidence that the value of the option to delay 
accepting a tender offer is likely to be higher for target firms with high BV/MV. We do find 21
evidence in support of Schwert (2000) for the US banking sector, since target firms with a 
high price to book value have lower option prices. However the result is not significant for 
MV/BV ratios, or as a ratio of the acquiring companies MV/BV.  
The empirical results by Schwert (2000) also show that targets with lower debt-to-equity 
ratios are more likely to be successfully taken over. Does this mean that they also render 
larger premiums for the option value to delay accepting the offer? We find no evidence in 
support of the premium that US banks pay in attracting target banks being related to target 
banks with a specifically low or lower debt-to-equity ratio. There is some anecdotal evidence 
that targets avoid takeover by adding debt through a leveraged recapitalization, however our 
results do not show empirical support for higher premiums being paid for banks with low debt 
ratio for the US banking industry. 
A likely explanation is in line with the hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers presented by 
Roll (1986). The first offer represents the maximum amount the acquirer can offer to make 
the acquisition a profitable deal. However, most managers engage in only very few 
acquisition during their career, while at the same time these acquisitions have a profound 
impact on their career. It is not only due to the increase in power but also due to the publicity 
that is associated with such a deal. Therefore, the reason for a second (higher) offer might be, 
that the management of the acquiring company willingly overpays for personal reasons. 
Abandoning the deal could be perceived badly. Acquisitions are often presented as necessary 
for the future of the acquiring company. Not completing a deal would question the credibility 
of the management. 22
III.3   Robustness Analysis 
As pointed out in the methodology section, the accuracy, stability and efficiency of the model 
is dependent on the amount of nodes included in the binomial lattice approach. A sensitivity 
analysis with different amounts of nodes was conducted to see the influence of a change on 
the final result of the option pricing model. Therefore, the initial amount of 125 nodes was 
doubled three times and the model was run with 125, 250, 500 and 1.000 nodes. Even though, 
Trigeorgis (1996) states that his application of the log-transformed binomial model with N = 
50 nodes and came up with a result that only deviates minimally from the standard binomial 
model of Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) with N = 500 nodes, this research starts with 125 
nodes and the empirical results given in the tables above are obtained with N = 250 nodes. 
When the nodes are doubled from 125 to 250, the option premium changes by more than three 
percent from 13.18% to 12.77%. If it is doubled again to 500 nodes, it only changes by 0.64% 
to 12.69%. Thus the result with N > 250 can be seen as reasonably accurate and stable. With 
regard to efficiency, the choice of 250 nodes also seems to be the best. When the amount of 
nodes is doubled from 125 to 250, the processing time is less than doubled from three to five 
seconds. If the amount of nodes is doubled further, the amount of processing time is more 
than doubled: from five to thirteen seconds for 500 nodes and to about 50 seconds for 1000 
nodes. 23
IV   Conclusions
This paper provides evidence, based on a large sample of actual mergers and acquisitions in 
the U.S. banking industry, that the real option pricing model for valuing the price of delaying 
in accepting a tender offer has descriptive value. This paper gives insight into the quantitative 
premium that can be obtained by target shareholders of a bank under acquisition from waiting 
to accept the tender offer. If the decision to delay accepting the tender offer is pursued, the 
average premium to the target shareholders amounts to 12.45%. The median values are lower 
with 5.2%, hinting towards large outliers in the data set. In any case the median values 
support the conclusion that target bank shareholders are better off by waiting when accepting 
a tender offer from a potential acquiring bank in the US banking industry. 
By delaying the decision to accept the tender offer, potential new entrants on the bidding 
process may occur. We find highly significant evidence that the premium is much greater, if 
competitors enter the bidding process. This finding holds for the total data set, as well as for 
various annual sub-samples. Several characteristics of banks that could potentially increase or 
decrease the likelihood of a larger option premium have been researched by conducting 
regression analyses with endogenous variables. Of all the researched variables, only a target 
banks’ price to book value and its earnings per share had a significant inverse relationship on 
the size of the option premium. A low price to book value means than an acquirer takes over a 
bank that seems to be worth more from its balance sheet for a lower price. A similar reasoning 
for target companies earnings to price ratios. Although these factors may be intuitively 
understood, both the coefficients of the estimates and the R
2 of the regressions were extremely 
low.  This would indicate that other non- firm specific factors play a greater role on the size of 24
the option premium and hence the value to the target bank in delaying the option to accept a 
tender offer. One explanation of the large value for the option premium is the hubris 
hypothesis of corporate takeovers presented by Roll (1986).  
The implications from this research are exactly opposite for acquiring banks. The longer the 
takeover process takes and the more reluctant the target shareholders are to accept the tender 
offer, the higher the price for the transaction and the more likely bidders will enter the 
process. That increase in the price can diminish all potential gains from realising synergies 
and economies of scope. Hence, whether to delay accepting a tender offer depends on the 
perspective. For target shareholders, patience always pays! 
The model developed has proved to be simple enough to be intuitively understood, yet 
complex enough to capture all the important factors influencing an option’s value. An analytic 
solution to the valuation problem would decrease the time needed to calculate the option’s 
value. However, since the development of an analytic solution is far more complex and does 
not necessarily improve the results, the practical and theoretical benefits of switching from a 
lattice model to an analytical model are limited. 
The real option model outlined in this paper has found empirical evidence of a large and 
significant premium to the target company in delaying to accept a tender offer from an 
acquiring bank. Using data for a sample of 424 US banks between 1997  and 2005 we find a 
value of 12.45% as a premium paid. The real option methodology enables us to break down 
the effects of time, stock market volatility on the value to the target bank of having this 
option. The most crucial factor is the effect of stock market volatility on the value of the 25
premium. Patience also pays in that it may attract competitors in the bidding process, which 
resulted in a significant gain in value to the option value and hence to the target bank’s 
shareholders.  
For future research it would be interesting to see if hostile takeovers render a larger option 
premium. We have also not yet analyzed multiple bidders (white knights), and the effect of 
seeking additional bidders to give the option greater value. Also, the financial ratio analysis 
has raised additional questions. As only two ratios of the target have been revealed to be 
significant, it would be of importance to find also variables for the acquiring firm that can 
help to predict the option premium. 26
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the US Dataset 
Parameters Description Mean  Median Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. 
St Target closing price 1 
day prior to 
announcement 
33.05 22.00 48.66  0.31  559.72 
Pt Initial price per share  40.53  26.94  61.93  0.45  738.6 
PT Accepted price per share  40.80  26.60  63.38  0.45  744.06 
V  PT – St in absolute values  7.74  4.70  23.59  -121.25  341.65 
X  Pt – St in absolute values  7.48  4.66  21.91  -121.25  335.75 
V (stand.)  Value of underlying asset 0.298  0.216  0.480  -0.648  7.688 
X (stand.)  Strike price  0.297  0.215  0.476  -0.648  7.688 
Var  Variance 0.075  0.012  0.673  0.000  14.776 
T  Time to maturity in days  161  157  74  0  967 
r  Risk-free rate  3.99%  4.32%  1.89%  0.00%  13.32% 
DivYie  Dividend yield  2.23%  1.89%  4.62%  0.00%  94.32% 29
Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Option Premium 
Mean Median  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Total   12.45% 5.22%  18.39% 0.00%  75.79% 
With 
Competitor 
18.43% 8.81%  25.60% 0.01%  75.79% 
Without 
Competitor 
8.00% 2.74% 14.46%  0.00% 70.49% 30
Table 3 – Firm specific explanatory variables for the discount in accepting a tender offer 
immediately 
 A 
Discount if accepting offer 
immediately     
                 
Target  Bank Variable   (1)  (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)  
       
       




05      
  6.83E-05 6.63E-05      




09    
  1.65E-09   1.26E-09    
Target Earnings Per Share 
-
0.010854   
-
0.019323
  0.013936   0.009838** 
Target Price to Book Value  
-
0.023623    -0.032226 
   0.017891          0.016521**
       
R2 0.028013 0.007704 0.007314 0.017079 0.016851 
Number of observations  224 224 224 224 224
 B 
Discount if accepting offer 
immediately    
                
Variable  (1)  (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   
       
       




0.000108    
  6.62E-05 6.44E-05      




10    
  4.86E-10   4.77E-10    
Acquirer Cash Flow per 
Share 
-
0.000156   
-
0.000133
 0.000184     0.000184
Acquirer Price to Book Value 
-
0.009589    
-
0.013631
   0.011438          0.011222
       
R2 0.021228 0.008974 0.010926 0.001660 0.004707
Number of observations  314 314 314 314 314
       
**  Significant  at  the  5%  level       31
Figure 1: Real option value as a function of the target bank’s stock price  
























Figure 2: Real option value as a function of time 




















Figure 3: Real option value as a function of the target banks stock price volatility 
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